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Sumnary  findings
The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across  Among the countries for which the authors could get
countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a  relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are
country changes more slowly than economic policies. Bai  indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern
and Wei propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be  consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with
an important structural determinant of open economy  possible reverse causality, they use the extent of
macroeconomic policies---especially  the imposition or  corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree
removal of capital controls.  of democracy, as the instrumental variables for
In their  model, capital controls are an instrument of  bureaucratic corruption.  The instrumental variable
financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the  regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries
economy but also generate implicit revenue for the  are associated with more s,vere capital controls.
government.  The  results show that bureaucratic  The results suggest that as countries develop and
corruption  translates into the government's  reduced  improve their public institiuions, reducing bureaucratic
ability to collect tax reventies. Even if capital controls  corruption  over time, they will choose to gradually
and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the  liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital
government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to  controls prematurely whert forced by outside institutions
provide public goods.  to do so could reduce rathar than improve their
economic efficiency.
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The quality of bureaucracy varies widely across countries. This paper examines the role
of bureaucratic quality in open-economy  macro policies, with a specific focus on the
imposition of capital controls and financial repression.
Capital controls and financial repression in developing countries were once
considered a severe hindrance to economic development (McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw,
1973). In the aftermath of the 1997-98  Asian economic crisis, an interesting twist in the
intellectual wisdom is emerging. Most economists now believe that capital account
liberalization without a proper domestic financial supervisory and regulatory structure in
place is a recipe for financial disasters. Several prominent economists go step further,
arguing that the benefits of capital account liberalization are probably negligible (e.g.,
Rodrik, 1999), or that restrictions on capital movement can serve useful policy functions
if one believes that international  portfolio flows and short term credits are excessively
volatile (Wyplosz, 1986; Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik and Velasco, 1999).
We look at capital controls/financial  repression from a different angle, namely,
bureaucratic quality as a potential determinant. An important, but sometirnes less
appreciated, fact is that the quality of bureaucracy evolves slowly relative to the speed
with which a government can implement many economic  policies, such as imposing or
removing capital controls. In a country with widespread bureaucratic corruption, the
government looses the ability to collect fiscal revenues from formal tax channels. Or
more precisely, the marginal cost of collecting tax revenues rises with the level of
corruption. As a consequence, it would have to rely increasingly on the otherwise
inefficient capital control/financial  repression to finance the provision of public goods.
In this case, a premature removal of capital controls (a possible mandate by the
International Monetary Fund) could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency.
This is a separate point from the possibility that a premature removal of capital controls
may increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.
Two relevant strands of the literature examine this issue. The first strand
examines the consequences or determinants of bureaucratic corruption (Rose-Ackerman
(1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997 and 1999),
land Wei (1997)1). The second strand examines the consequences or determinants of
capital controls (Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Epstein and Schor (1992), Dellas and
Stockman (1993), Dooley and Isard (1980), Lane and Rojas-Suarez (1992), Mathieson
and Rojas-Suarez (1993), Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Aizenman and
Guidotti (1994), Bartolini and Drazen (1997), and Grilli and Miles-Ferretti (1995).
As far as we know, none of these papers looked directly at the connection
between corruption and capital controls. Of course, those papers emphasizing the public
finance motivation for capital controls are direct predecessors to this paper. Our
contribution is to argue (and to provide the first model and first piece of evidence) that
bureaucratic corruption may be the underlying reason for the difficulty in tax collection
and, as a result, greater reliance on capital controls.
It is possible that the existence of capital controls breeds corruption as
firms/individuals find it necessary to pay bribes in order to circumvent the control.
Indeed, we need to take into account this possibility in the empirical examination. The
central focus of this paper is on the reverse question, How is the imposition and severity
of capital controls affected by the extent of corruption in the country? In other words, we
take the extent of bureaucratic corruption as an exogenous "state of nature," in the sense
that it is part of the public institutional infrastructure  that is slow to evolve. More
precisely, it is assvried that a government or top political leader can impose/remove
capital control or change its severity  much more swiftly than altering the extent of
2 bureaucratic corruption in the country.
The term "bureaucratic corruption" we use encompasses  various dimensions of
the quality of bureaucracy, including government efficiency and burden of regulation,
and not just bribe-taking by officials. Unfortunately, we have no direct measures of these
dimensions. What we can feasibly gather are measures of bureaucratic corruption based
on the perceptions of experts, firm managers, or citizens. Our suspicion is that the
different dimensions of bureaucratic quality are highly correlated. Nonetheless, it is
useful to keep this broad perspective in mind when interpreting our results.
See Pardhan (1997) <add to refs> and Wei (2000) for a more complete review of the literature.
2 A possible extension of the model is to allow corruption and capital controls (or policy distortions in
general) to influence each other, possibly leading to multiple equilibria.
2Our paper is organized in the following  way.  Section 2 presents a model that
formalizes our story. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section
4 reports the empirical evidence on our hypothesis. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Theoretical  Model
In our theoretical model capital control is endogenously determined by the
government in a way that is related to the level of corruption in the country. A welfare-
maximizing government (top leader) collects revenue to provide public goods, but our
central story applies if the top leader simply collects revenue for her private consumption.
2.1 Setup of the Model
We consider a model with a representative investor in the private sector, a
bureaucrat, and a government. The representative private investor's utility increases with
the amount of the public good provided by the government, denoted by X, as well as his
private consumption, denoted by Y, whose price is normalized to be one. Specifically, we
assume that the expected utility function is
UEp  = E{I-esY-YX},
where 5 > 0 and y > 0.
The investor is endowed with a fixed wealth YO.  His consumption depends on tax
T and investment opportunities. We assume that he can invest his net weal.th  YO  - T in a
portfolio of domestic and foreign assets. Denote the return to the domestic asset by Rd
and that to the foreign asset by Rf. The two returns can be different for reasons we will
discuss later. Suppose the investor allocates a share of his net wealth to the foreign asset.
Then his consumption will be
Y = (Yo - T)[aRf  + (lI-a)Rd].
For simplicity, let us say that both the domestic and foreign assets are risk free. In
the absence of capital controls, both are equal to the world interest rate, Rf =  Rd = r*. Of
course, in this case, the representative domestic agent is indifferent between domestic and
foreign assets, and the optimal a is undetermined.
3In this model, we recognize that capital control is an instrument of financial
repression. It has two effects. First, because circumventing capital control is costly, it
reduces the rate of return on investing aboard that is available to domestic investor, so
that now Rf  <  r*. Second, because circumventing capital control runs the risk of being
caught and punished, the effective rate of return on the foreign asset faced by the
domestic agent now becomes risky, and in equilibrium  would on average be somewhat
higher than the domestic (still risk-free) interest rate, E {Rf}  > Rd  To be simple and
concrete, we will assume (rather than derive) a specific functional form linking the extent
of capital control, denoted by k, and the equilibrium domestic and foreign rates of return
Rd = r* - pk
Rf  =  r* - pk + pfk  + kv
where p is the effectiveness of capital control, v is a random variable with a normal
distribution N(O, a2) and represents the risk that capital control causes to investing in
foreign assets, and pf indicates that capital control is less effective in depressing the
return to foreign assets than to domestic assets. Ideally, we should assume a distribution
for the random variable, v, which is bounded from above. For simplicity, we make it an
unbounded normal variable.
The amount of public good provided by the government, X, depends on its
available resources, denoted by Z.
x  = fZ),
where f is an increasing and concave function.
The government raises tax T. Corruption results in part of the tax revenue being
stolen by the bureaucrat. Suppose  the bureaucrat's stealing is
S = S(T, 0)
where 0 is a paramneter  representing the weakness of governance, or the degree of
corruption.
We assume that S is increasing in T and 0 respectively and is convex in T.
Furthermore, STO  > 0. In other words, as either the total amount of tax or corruption
increases, stealing by bureaucrats also increases. Furthermore, as either total tax or
corruption increases, marginal stealing per unit of tax collected also increases. In
4Appendix A, we offer a plausible justification for these assumptions. We label the
fraction of formal taxes that disappears as "stealing" by the corruption-prone bureaucrats.
Alternatively,  we could also interpret it as "waste" of government resources by the
inefficient and corrupt bureaucrats.
The government's total usable fiscal resources, Z, consist of two components: an
explicit tax revenue net of stealing (or waste), and an implicit tax revenue derived from
financial repression. One possible example of implicit revenue is the saving by the
government in its cost of borrowing from the domestic capital market when the domestic
interest rate is artificially suppressed to below the world interest rate. 3 We assume that
the implicit revenue from the financial depression depends on the reduction in domestic
interest rate as a result of capital controls, pk, and the total amount of domestic savings,
(Yo  - T). Then,
Z =  [T - S(T,  0)] + [+pk(Yo  - T)].
In Appendix C, we employ an alternative  assumption in which the implicit tax revenue is
*pk(l-a)(Yo  - T).  In other words, it depends only on the amount of domestic savings
that is not invested abroad. We show that while this complicates the mathematical
derivations, the basic qualitative conclusion of the model is still the same.
We consider a sequential game in which the government moves first, choosing
explicit tax T and the degree of capital control k to maximize the social welfare, taking as
given the weakness of the public institution (i.e., the extent of corruption), the
bureaucrat's stealing function, and the private investor's reaction function. The
representative private investor moves next, choosing an optimal allocation between
capital flight and domestic investmnent,  taking into account the tax and capital control.
We solve the game with backward induction.
2.2 The Private Investor's Decision
Given his portfolio choice a,  the private investor's consumption is
Y = (Yo  - T)(r* - pk + apfk + akv).
3 One  could  also  think  of seigniorage  revenue  as another  source  of imnplicit  revenue.  Giovannini  and de
Melo (1993)  made  a conceptual  distinction  between  financial  repression  and  seigniorage,  but also  showed
that  the two  are positively  correlated  across  countries.
5Then, his expected utility is
-eYXe-CE,
where
CE = (Yo  - T)(r* - pk + apfk) - O.55a  2k2(Yo - T)2Cs2
is his certainty equivalent consumption level. Then, an expected utility maximizing
investor should choose a to maximize CE. The first-order condition for a is
(Yo  - T)pfk - 8ak2(Yo  - T)2a2 = 0
and the optimal choice of a is
a* = [kpf] / [8k 2a2(Yo - T)] = pj[8ka2(yo - T)].
cc*  is the proportion of after-tax wealth invested in foreign assets, or the extent of capital
flight. The above equation implies that capital flight decreases with the risk of the flight,
k2&2  and with the rate of risk aversion, 8, but increases with the premium of investing
aboard, kpf
Given the optimal portfolio choice a*, the private investor's utility level is
Up*  = -exp{-yfiT  - S(T, 0) + fpk(Yo - T)] - 8(Yo  - T)(r* - pk) - 0.5pf 2/C  2}.
2.3. The Government's Decision
The government chooses k and T to maximize the above utility level of the
representative private investor, or equivalently, the government maximizes
Ug(k,  T) = yf[T  - S(T, 0) + fpk(Yo - T)] + 8(Yo  - T)(r* - pk) + 0.5pf2la2.
Lemma 1: Suppose Or*  < I and O  is not too small. Then, the optimal Tis determined by
SI 2 T, 9) = I - 4r*  (1)
and the optimal k is determined by
T-  S(T, 9) + qpk(Yo  - T) =  (f67c5'[/(ro)].  (2)
Proof: The government's objective function Ug is not necessarily concave in T.
Therefore, it is not clear whether or not the first-order conditions of the optimization
problem are sufficient. To circumvent  this problem, we maximize the objective function
in two steps.
6First, for any given T, Ug is a concave function of k and the optima].  k satisfies the
first-order condition
yf'[T - S(T, 0) + fpk(Yo - T)]4p( Yo  - T) - 8p(Yo  - T) = 0,
or
yf'[T - S(T, 0) + fpk(Yo - T)]+ - 8 = 0,
which implies
T - S(T, 0) + Xpk(Yo  - T) = (fZ1[6/(*y)]  Z*.
Then, the government's problem becomes maximizing Ug subject tO  the above
first-order condition for k; that is,
Max T Ug(k,  T) = yf[T - S(T, 0) + 4pk(Yo  - T)] + 8(Yo  - T)(r* - pk) + 0.5pf2/¢2
subject to: T - S(T, 0) + 4pk(Yo  - T) = Z.
From the constraint,
pk(Yo  - T) = [Z* - T + S(T, 0)]/4.
Substitute the above equation into Ug. Then
Ug (T) = yf(Z*)  + or*(Yo  - T) - 6pk(Yo  - T) + 0.5  pf 2/a2
= yf(Z*) + or*(Yo  - T) -o[Z* - T  + S(T, 0))/4  +  a5pf 2/&.
By the assumption that S(T, 0) is convex in T, the reduced form of Ug  is concave in T.
Then the optimal T is determined by the first-order condition that
Ug'(T) = -or* + 8/+ -8ST(T,  0)/+ = 0,
or
ST(T,  0) = 1 - fr*.  Q.E.D.
Remark 1: If + is so large that 1 - fr* < 0, or in other words, if financial repression is
very effective at raising revenue for the government, the optimal T = 0. To see this, note
that Ug'(T) < 0 for all T if 1 -4r* < 0.
Remark 2: Suppose 1 - 4r* > 0. If corruption is negligible and hence stea].ing  by the
bureaucrat is negligible, then it is optimal not to have any capital control. Specifically, if
0 is so small that ST(T,  O)  <  1 -Xr*  for all T < Yo,  then Ug(T) > 0 for all T < YO  and it is
optimal to choose T large enough to fulfill the need for public good provision and to
choose k = 0.
7The lemma implies that both direct taxation and capital control are used for the
government to obtain resources to finance public good provision. The intuitive reason for
this mixture to be optimal is as follows. The stealing fimction S(T, 0) is concave in T.
Therefore, the marginal cost of T increases. On the other hand, the marginal cost of
capital control - depressed return to investment  - is a constant. Then, the marginal cost of
T is higher than that of k when T is too high, and is lower when T is too low. As a result,
only part of the expenditure for public good provision should be financed by direct
taxation T.
2. 4. Comparative Statics
Proposition 1: The optimal capital control k increases with the level of bureaucratic
corruption 0, while the optimal tax collection T decreases with the corruption level 0.
The proofs for this proposition and the next are provided in Appendix B. The
results in Proposition 1 are not difficult to understand intuitively. As corruption increases,
more tax revenue will be stolen, then it is more desirable to finance the public good by
capital control/financial repression rather than by direct taxation.
Proposition 2: (i) The optimal tax T is independent  of the degree of risk aversion p but
the optimal capital control k decreases with p. (ii) The optimal tax T decreases with 0 but
the relationship between the optimal k and  ' is ambiguous. (iii) The optimal T is
independent of rand  ,  but the optimal k increases with yand decreases with d  where r
is the importance of the public good in the representative  private investor's utility while S
is that ofprivate consumption. (iv) The optimal T and k are both independent of pf and
0.
Intuitively, as p increases, the returns to investment decrease, and the govenment
resources from capital control increase, at the same proportion. This implies that the level
8of public good provision and T should not change. With the increase in the government's
ability to extract resources from capital control, there is less need for the control in order
to obtain the given level of resources for public good provision; that is the optimal k
decreases. This is the reason for part (i) of Proposition 2.
The intuition for (ii) is as follows. As 4  increases, the government can get more
resources from capital control and therefore has less need for direct taxation, resulting in
lower T.  The increase in 4  has two effects on k. The positive one (similar to the
substitution effect) is that more resources should be extracted from capital control and the
negative one (similar to the income effect) is that less control is needed in order to extract
a given level of resources. It is not clear which one of these effects dominate.
As the public good becomes more important to the investor's utility relative to
private consumption, i.e., as y increases or 8 decreases, the benefit of capilal control -
increasing the resources available for public provision - becomes larger and the cost of
capital control - decreasing the returns to private investment - becomes srnaller.
Therefore, k should increase. The effect of y and o on T is not so straightforward. When
the public good becomes more important, it seems that more tax should be levied to
increase public good provision. A larger T, however, reduces the opporturity for the
government to obtain resources from capital control, thus reducing public good provision.
The two effects of T happen to cancel with each other in this model. As a result, the
optimal T is independent of y and 6. This is the reason for (iii).
To understand (iv), note that pf and a2 enter into the government's objective
function Ug(k,  T) only through a term that is independent  of k and T. Therefore, the
marginal effects of k and T on Ug(k,  T) are independent of pf and C2. Consequently,  the
optimal k and T are both independent of pf and c2.
3. Data
The detailed definition and source for the data as well as their manipulation are
explained in Appendix D. Here, we provide a brief description on the most important
variables in our empirical analysis.
93.1 Capital Control
Our capital controls are derived from the annual issues of the IMF's into five
categories of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions that the IMF has consistently
coded throughout our sample, 1984-1997. They are (1) existence of multiple exchange
rates, (2) payment arrears and bilateral payments arrangement, (3) controls on payments
for invisible transactions and current transfers, (4) controls on proceeds from exports
and/or invisible transactions, and finally, (5) controls on capital account transactions. For
each category, the IMF source indicates whether the country has restrictions or not.
We derive a discreet-valued measure of the severity of capital control by
aggregating the five categories. Thus, the measure can take one of the six values from
zero to five, zero being no controls in any of the five categories, and five being controls
in all five categories. For exact definitions of the six categories see Appendix B.
3.2 Bureaucratic Corruption
We use four different measures of corruption: ICRG, GCR, WDR, and TI
indexes. In addition, we use two variables as instrumental variables for corruption: legal
corruption and democracy.
(A) International Countrv Risk Guide (ICRG) Index.
The ICRG corruption index has been produced every year since 1982 by Political
Risk  Services, a  private  international investment risk  service.  The  ICRG index is
apparently based on the opinion of experts and supposedly captures the extent to which
"high government officials are likely to demand special payments"  and the extent to
which "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government"
in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessments, police protection, or loans."
(B) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) Index
Unlike the ICRG indices, the GCR index is based  on a  1996 survey of firm
managers, rather than experts or consultants.  This survey, sponsored by  the World
Economic Forum (WEF), a Europe-based consortium with a large membership of firns,
10and designed by the Harvard Institute for International Development (IMID), asked the
responding firms about various aspects of "competitiveness" in the host countries where
they invest. The  question on  corruption asked  the  respondents  (2,381 firms  in  58
countries) to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-seven scale according to the extent
of "irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications." The
GCR corruption index for a particular country is the average of all respondents' ratings
for that country.
(C) World Development  Report (WDR) Index
Similar to the GCR index, the WDR index is based on a  1996 survey of firms
conducted by the World Bank for its  1997 World Development Report.  Respondents
were asked a long list of questions, including one on perceived level of corruption.  The
question is essentially identical to the one in the GCR survey.  The WDR survey covers
over 70 countries (many of which are not in the VVDR  sample, and the reverse is also
true).  The WDR survey tends to cover more medium and small firms whereas the GCR
survey covered larger firms.
(D) Transparency International (TI) Index
The  TI  index  has  been  produced  annually  since  1995  by  Transparency
International,  an  international  non-governmental organization  dedicated  to  fighting
corruption worldwide.  This index is based on a weighted average of approximately 10
surveys of varying coverage. It ranks corruption in countries on a one-to-ten scale.
As a survey of surveys, the TI index has advantages and disadvantages.  If the
measurement errors in different surveys are independent and identically dlistributed  (iid),
the averaging process used to produce the TI index may reduce the measurement error.
But the iid assumption may not hold.  Moreover, since different surveys cover different
subsets of countries, the averaging process may introduce new measurernent errors when
cross-country rankings  are produced. Because the TI  indexes in  difierent years  are
derived from potentially different set of surveys, they should not  be used to measure
changes in corruption level over time for a particular country.
11(E)  First IV for Corruption: Democracy
Democracy is measured by adding up an index for civil liberties and another for
political rights. The Freedom House composes both indexes. The liberties  index measures
the extent to which people are able to express  their opinion openly without fear of reprisals
and are protected  in doing so by an independent  judiciary. Although this index reflects
rights to organize and demonstrate,  as well as freedom  of religion, education,  travel and
other personal  rights, more weight was given liberties  most directly related to the
expression  of political rights. This variable is an index and not in logs.
The political rights index measures meaningful  participation in the political process
on a scale of one to seven where lower numbers indicate  greater political rights (see Gastil,
1989). A high-ranking  country must have a fully  operating electoral procedure,  usually
including a significant  opposition vote. It is likely to have had a recent change  of
government  from one party to another, an absence  of foreign domination,  decentralized
political power and a consensus that allows all segments  of the population some power.
The index was constructed on the basis of satisfaction  of the above and other related
criteria  by the countries  in question. This variable is an index and not in logs.
Both indexes  use a range from 1 to 7. A smaller number means a higher  degree of
freedom. Democracy is defined as (7-civ)+(7-pol).
(F) Second IV Variable for Bureaucratic Corruption: Corruption in the Judicial System
A measure for corruption in a country's judicial system is based on the same GCR
survey that produced the GCR bureaucratic corruption measure. Survey question 8.09
asked the respondents to rate the level of corruption in the judicial system based on the
extent to which"[i]rregular  payments to judges or other officials involved in the
enforcement and execution of judgements are not common and do not influence the
outcome of court proceedings" (l=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). We rescaled the
index (7 - original score) so that a larger number means more corrupt judicial system.
Tables la and lb report summary statistics for the key variables and their pairwise
correlations.
124. Statistical  Analysis
Since our measure of capital controls can take six discrete values from a
minimum of zero to a maximum of five, we employ an ordered Probit specification:
Capital Control in Country  j = k
if  Dk <  Yj*  < Dk+
where Yj* =  0 Corruptionj  + Xj i + ej
k = 0, 1, 2,...,  5; Do = -oo. and D6 = oo;  DI, 1 .,  D 5 are parameters estimated together with
scalar 0 and vector 3; X is a vector of control variables other than corruption; and ej is an
independently and identically distributed normal variate with a zero mean.
Table 2 presents simple regressions of the measure of capital control severity on
corruption and a dummy indicating membership in OECD. OECD membership in recent
years often requires capital account liberalization (which was the case when Mexico and
Korea obtained their membership in 1994 and 1996, respectively). The first four
columns use four different measures of corruption: TI, GCR, WDR and ICRG,
respectively. In each of these regressions, the extent of capital controls is positively
related to the countries' perceived level of corruption.
By using the ICRG corruption measures for 1982-96,  we implemented a quasi-
fixed-effects  panel regression where year and region dummies are included as additional
regressors. The result is reported in Column 5.  The coefficient on the ICRG-corruption
measure is smaller than the corresponding one in the cross-section regression in Column
4. But it remains positive and significant at the 10 percent level, again consistent with the
hypothesis that capital controls are more likely in more corrupt countries.
One may be concerned that the four measures of corruption so far can be tainted
by reverse causality. More precisely, since illegal/irregular  payments made to
circumvent exchange controls are part of the criteria used to assess the degree of
corruption, in a very direct sense, countries  with more severe capital controls would also
be rated as more corrupt. To deal with this, we employ an instrumental variable related
to the extent of corruption in a country but (arguably) not directly a consequence of
13capital controls. Two such variables are considered. The first measures corruption in a
country's judicial system. When a country's legal system is corrupt, corrupt officials are
less likely to be punished. The second variable measures the degree of democracy (civil
liberties and political rights). Democracy enhances accountability. Lack of democracy
breeds corruption and embezzlement. Neither legal corruption nor democracy is likely to
be directly influenced by the imposition or severity of capital controls.
In the last column of Table 2, we use these two variables as instruments for the
GCR-corruption  measure. As we can see, the point estimate on corruption is somewhat
smaller than the corresponding regression without the IVs (column 2, Table 2).
However, the coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. So this is stronger
evidence that more corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls.
In Table 3, we add three regional dummies to the regression (in addition to the
OECD membership dummy). Sub-Sahara African countries always have a positive sign
in all six regressions (indicating a tendency to have more severe capital controls),
whereas East Asian and Latin American countries mostly have a negative sign (indicating
a tendency to have ltss controls). However, for each regional dummy, the coefficient is
often insignificantly different from zero in many specifications. The most important
observation for our purpose is that the coefficient on corruption remains positive in all
specifications  and significant in five out of six specifications (including one in which
corruption is instrumented  by legal corruption and democracy).
Grilli and Miles-Ferretti (1995) and Miles-Ferretti (1998) have argued that
government consumption-to-GDP  ratio and government debt-to-GDP ratio are proxies
for a government's preference for spending. This could be perfectly consistent with our
theoretical model: other things constant, if the government prefers to spend more money,
it would want to collect more revenues  both from the formal tax channel and
simultaneously from the financial repression channel with tightened capital controls. 4 In
addition to the government's preference for spending, these authors also propose proxies
for the (marginal) cost of capital controls. In particular, they argue that an independent
central bank makes it difficult for the government to rely on seigniorage revenue, and
4 In our model, the equilibrium capital control, k, rises with an increase in the relative importance of
the public goods in the government's objective function, y/6. See Proposition 2 in the model section.
14hence reduces its incentive to impose capital controls. Following Cukier-ian,  Edwards
and Tabellini (1992), they use an index of legal independence of central banks and a
count of average annual turnover rate of the central bank governors as two measures of
central bank independence. Related to this, the rate of inflation can be a more direct
measure of the degree of financial repression the government is willing to exercise. These
authors argue further that a government experiencing a current account deficit is less
likely to impose capital controls.
One could argue that most of the variables used by these are also related to the
underlying corruption in a country in a way that is consistent with our model. For
example, rather than viewing central bank independence as exogenous, a corrupt country
may be more inclined to choose a non-zero inflation rate and at the same time not to have
an independent central bank. 5
In any case, as a robustness check, we include these variables in oulr  specification
as additional regressors. The results are reported in Table 4.  Since the namber of
countries with non-missing values for these variables is small (among those countries that
also have corruption measures), we have between 23-30 observations in the current
regressions, less than half than the corresponding  regressions in Tables 2 and 3. In the
first three columns of Table 4, where a different measure of corruption is used in each
column, we see evidence that countries with high government consumption-to-GDP
ratios also tend to impose capital controls. However, our regressions do not support the
association between current account deficit, high inflation, and high government debt-to-
GDP ratios tend and more severe capital controls (once corruption and other variables are
taken into account). In fact, the signs on the coefficients for inflation ancL  government
debt are negative. Importantly, even in this very small sample, the corruption measure
continues to exhibit a positive and statistically significant sign.
Using the ICRG measures of corruption, we experiment with two versions of
panel regressions. The first is a quasi-fixed effects regression in which regional dummies
in addition to year dummies are included. The second is a random-effects regression in
which random country effects in addition to year dummies are included. In  the first panel
See Huang  and Wei (2000)  for a model and some evidence.
15regression, there is some support for a positive association between inflation and capital
controls. In both regressions, corruption continues to enter positively and significantly.
Finally, when we use the extent of legal corruption and the degree of democracy
as instruments  for general corruption (the last two columns), we find that the coefficients
on corruption are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, even in a small sample
such as this and with more control variables, there is robust evidence that more corrupt
countries are more likely to impose capital controls.
Since 1997, the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER) has given substantially  more detailed information on a country's
restrictions on up to 50 items of capital account transactions (and similarly detailed
information on restrictions on current account transactions). This in principle would
enrich our analysis. However, the tradeoff is that such detailed information is only
available for 41 countries, many of which do not have data on corruption ratings. Given
our already small number of countries in the sample, this could be a significant cost.
In any case, we relate two separate measures of current account and capital
account restrictions based on the detailed information  to the measures of corruption in
Tables 6 and 7.  The results are interesting.  When the dependent variable is current
account restrictions, the coefficient for corruption is insignificant in four out of five
regressions (Table 6). However, when the dependent variable is capital account
restrictions, corruption has a positive and significant coefficient in three out of five
regressions including the one with instrumental variables (Table 7).  To the extent that it
is primarily the capital account restrictions rather than current account restrictions that
generate financial repression in the country, these findings are also consistent with our
hypothesis.
As a cross-validation,  we take a look at our hypothesis from a different
perspective. Our model's central story is a revenue loss story: the government has
difficulty in collecting revenue through formal tax channels and hence has to rely more
on capital controls and financial repression. Therefore, one would think that if tax
evasion in a country can be measured, it should be positively correlated with corruption.
In the Global Competitiveness Report survey, respondents were asked to assess the extent
of tax evasion in the country. We use the mean response for each country as a
16(subjective)  measure of the extent of tax evasion. In Table 8, we regress tax evasion on
corruption and statutory tax rate. We find that tax evasion is more pervasive in a country
with a higher tax rate and a high level of corruption, exactly as our hypothesis would
suggest.
5.  Conclusion
This paper studies bureaucratic corruption as a determinant of capital controls. In our
model, capital control is an instrument of financial repression. While it entails efficiency
loss for the economy, it also generates implicit revenue for the government. The more
severe the bureaucratic corruption in a country, the more difficult it is to collect formal
taxes. As a result, the government has to rely more on capital controls/financial
repression. In cross-country regressions, we find that more corrupt countries, measured
by any of the four corruption indexes, or instrumented  by the degree of democracy and
legal corruption in a country, tend to impose more severe capital controls.
If our story is true, then as countries gradually develop better pubkic  institutions along
their development trajectory, including reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they
will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. However, a premature removal
of capital controls forced upon by external organizations  could reduce economic
efficiency.
17Appendix A: Justification of the Bureaucrat's Decision
In this appendix, we derive the properties of function S(T, 0) by considering the
bureaucrat's decision of choosing S. 0 is a measure of the extent of corruption or the
weakness of public institutions. To simplify the derivation,  we interpret 0-1  as a measure
of the total resources available for monitoring the bureaucrat. Suppose (OT)-1  units of
resources are devoted to the monitoring of each unit of tax revenue. Furthermore, the
probability that the bureaucrat is found stealing from any given unit of tax revenue is
y(S/T)(0T)-', where y is a convex function and S/T is the proportion of each unit of tax
revenue being stolen. Finally, the penalty imposed on the bureaucrat for being caught
stealing from a unit of tax revenue is C. For each unit of tax revenue, the bureaucrat
steals S/T, and the expected cost (penalty) of his stealing is CY(S/T)(OT)- 1. Then the
bureaucrat's total expected payoff is
T[S/T -Cy(S/T)(OT)- 1] = S -TCyj(S/T)(OT)- 1.
Suppose the bureaucrat chooses S to maximize the above expression. Then his optimal
choice of S is given by the first-order condition
I - Cy'(S/T)(OT)-'  = 0.
Consequently,  the optimal S is
S = T-(OTC-'),
where -X  is the inverse function of y'  and is increasing. The derivative of S with respect to
0 is
SO  = Tr'(OTC  1)TC-' > 0.
The derivative of S with respect to T is
ST = T + Tr'OC  > 0.
Differentiate the above expression and rearrange. Then,
STT  = OC1-r'(z)[2  + ZT±  (Z)/T (Z)],
where z = OTC-. Suppose function T satisfies the condition that
2 + z-T"(z)/r(z)  > 0,  (4)
which holds for r(z) =  A(z+b)P  + C, and for T(z)  = AeBz + C2, for any A, B, b, Cl, C2, and
> 0.  Then, STT  > 0, i.e., S is convex in T. Similarly, we can prove that ST(  > 0 under
condition (4).
18Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate equation (1) in Lemma 1 with respect to 0. Then
SrrTo +  STO  = 0,
which implies
TO-  STO/STT  < 0.
Differentiate equation (2) in Lemma 1 with respect to 0. Then
To - STTO  - So  + fp(Yo - T)ke  - fpkTo = 0,
or
Op(Yo  - T)ko = So  - Te(I - ST  - 4pk).  (3)
By equation (1),
I - ST  - Opk  = 0(r* - pk) = 4Rd  >  0.
Since So  > 0 and To  < 0, (3) implies
ko>0.  Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) From equation (1), T is independent of p. Then, equation (2) implies that pk is
independent of p, which in turn implies that k decreases with p.
(ii) Differentiating equation (1) with respect to 0 yields
To  = -r*/STT  < 0.
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to 0 and rearranging yield
Op(Yo  - T)k  = -pk(Yo  - T) - To (1 - ST  -OPk)  - {[(fy 1]'(6/y4)}(6/7y
2 ).
On the right-hand side, the first term is negative, the second term is positive as To < 0 and
by the proof of Proposition 1, and the third term is also positive because f' is a decreasing
function. Therefore, the sign of kt whether the first term dominates, or is dominated by,
the other two terms.
19(iii) By equation (1), T is independent of 7 and &.  The right-hand side of equation (2)
increases with y and decreases with 6 as f  is a decreasing function. Therefore, k increases
with y and decreases with 6.
(iv) Both equations (1) and (2) are independent of pf and CT 2. Therefore, the optimal T and
k are both independent of pf and c2 . Q.E.D.
20Appendix C: Alternative Assumption on the Implicit Revenue from Financial
Repression
In this appendix, we consider the alternative assumption  that the irnplicit  tax
revenue from financial repression is 4pk(1-cc)(Yo-T).  With this assumption.,  the amount
of the government's usable fiscal resources is
Z = [T - S(T, 0)] + [4pk(1-a)(Yo-T)].
The private investor's choice of a is not affected by this alternative assumption and is
still a*. Given
a =  a* = pf/[6ka2(yo  - T)],
we have
ka*(Yo  - T) = pd/(&a 2)
and then
Z = T - S(T, 0) + 4pk(Yo  - T) - Ppf/(&T),
which differs from the value of Z under the original assumption about the implicit tax
revenue only by a constant term - 4ppd(6&Y2).  Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can
show that
Lemma 1': The optimal T is determined by
STfT,  9)  = I-  Or*  1
and the optimal k is determined by
T-  S(T, 9)  + Opk(Yo  - T) =  f) -J fo  /(Yfr)] + qppf/(5).  (2)
Comparative Statics:
Proposition 1 is about comparative statics with respect to 0. LemTia 1 and
Lemma 1 differ only by the term fppd(3&2),  which is independent of 0. Therefore,
Proposition 1 continues to hold under the alternative assumption about the implicit tax
revenue.
Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of Proposition 2 remain the same. However, the result about
k in part (iv) changes with the alternative assumption about the implicit tax revenue;
21previously, the optimal k was independent of pf and a 2, but under the alternative
assumption, the optimal k increases with pf and decreases with a2. Specifically, we have
Proposition 2': (i) The optimal tax T is independent  of the degree of risk aversion p but
the optimal capital control k decreases with p. (ii) The optimal tax T decreases with 0 but
the relationship between the optimal k and qi  is ambiguous. (iii) The optimal T is
independent  of rand  5, but the optimal k increases with yand decreases with , where y
is the importance  of the  public good in the representative  private investor's utility while S
is that of private consumption. (iv) The optimal T is independent  of pfand  W. The
optimal k increases with pf and decreases with W2.
The proof of Proposition 2' is similar to that of Proposition 2, except that for (i) is
different. By equation (1'), T is still independent  of p. By equation (2'),
tp[k(Yo  - T) - pf/(6 a)]  = Z* - T + S(T, 0).
On the left-hand side,
k(Yo  - T) - pt(5a)  = k(l-c*)(Yo - T) > 0.
Therefore, Z* -T + S(T, 0) is also positive. Furthermore, Z* - T + S(T, 0) is independent
of p. Then,
k(Yo  - T) - pf/(8a 2) = [Z* - T + S(T, 0)]/4p
decreases with p, which implies that k decreases with p.
The intuition for Proposition 2' is the same as that for Proposition 2, except that
for part (iv) of the propositions. Under the alternative assumption about the implicit tax
revenue, a higher pf (premium of capital flight) or a lower c2 (risk of capital flight)
reduces the amount of domestic capital that the government can implicitly tax through
financial repression. In order to maintain the level of this source of revenue, the
government has to increase the degree of financial repression, which is positively related
to capital control. Therefore, the government responds to a higher pf or a lower a2 by
choosing a higher k.
22Appendix D: Data Documentation
1. We used two measures of Capital Control. The first one is a based on the presence or
absence of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions in five categories defined in the
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER),  various issues. Courtesy of Milesi-Ferretti for data on the last three of the
five categories.
Multiple Exchange Rates: mulex
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Dual or multiple exchange rates.
Assign 1 if the specified practice is a feature of the exchange system, 0 otherwise.
If missing replaced with 1995/96 data.
Payment Arrears or Bilateral Payment Arrangement:  payarr & bipay
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998,  IMF.
Arrangements  for payments and receipts: payment arrears or bilateral payment
arrangements.
Assign I if any of the specified practice is present, 0 otherwise.
If missing replaced with 1995/96 data.
Controls on Payments for Invisible Transactions and Current Transfers: rescur
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Control on payments for invisible transactions and current transfers
Assign 1 if the specified practice is present for either items, 0 otherwise. If missing
replaced with 1995/96 data.
Controls on Proceeds from Exports and/or Invisible Transactions: resexp
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1997/1998, IMF.
Proceeds from exports and/or invisible transactions.
2 items: repatriation requirements, surrender requirements
Assign 1 if the specified practice is a feature of the exchange system for either items, 0
otherwise.
*  Among the two items, if one if missing and the other one is 1, assign '.
*  Among the two items, if one is missing and the other is 0, assign 0, countries include:
Antigua and Barbuda
Controls on Capital Account Transactions: cap
Source: Exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions annual report 1  997/1998, IMF.
Controls on capital transactions:
1997 has Controls on 11 items, 1996 has only the first 10 items.
1.  Capital market securities
2.  Money market instruments
3.  Collective investment securities
4.  Derivatives and other instruments
5.  Commercial credits
236.  Financial credits
7.  Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities
8.  Direct investment
9.  Liquidation of direct investment
10. Real estate transactions
11. Personal capital movements
1997 data: Assign 1 for each item if the sum of the features>3,  0 otherwise. Treat as
missing if there are >4 missing categories.
If there are <=3 missing categories, we assign the most common ratings in the rest
of the categories to replace the missing values. These countries are: Algeria, Angola,
Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Columbia, Comoros, Congo, Rep. of, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica,
Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Oman,
Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Sit. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian,
Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe
1996 data: Only look at the first 10 items: Assign 1 for each item if the sum of
features>3,  0 otherwise. Treat as missing if there are >4 missing values.
1995 and before:
Used the data on Southern Yemen (data closer to later data) for Yemen Rep.
Used the data on Belgium-Luxembourg  for both Belgium and Luxembourg.
1991 and before:
Used the data on Czechoslovakia for Czech and Slovakia:
Used the data on former Yugoslavia for Yugoslavia, FDR;
Before 1989: Used the data on West Germany for Germany.
Second measure of Capital Control is more detailed coding of restrictions on
close to 50 items of capital account transactions (together with a similarly detailed coding
of current account restrictions), computed by Natalia Tamirisa for Tamirisa (1999) and
Johnston and etc. (1999), based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AR-EAER),  1997. Courtesy of Natalia
Tamirisa.
2. Measures of Corruption
ICRG Index
Corruption in Government from the International Country Risk Guide.
Bahamas, Malta, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, FR (Serb./Mont.): usd the data from
1986 for 1985; Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Congo, Rep., Gambia, The, Guinea-Bissau,
Korea, Dem. Rep., Malta, Mongolia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Rep., Yugoslavia,
24FR(Serb./Mont.),  used the data from 1985/86 for 1984. Original scale 0-6, Lower point
totals indicate higher risk, rescale as 6 - original score.
TI Index
Source: Transparency International (http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/icr.htm),  used 1998
index, which will be the ranking for 1997.
CPI has adopted the approach of a composite index. It is a "poll of polls". It
consists of credible surveys using different sampling frames and varying methodologies.
The 1998 CPI includes data from the Economist Intelligence  Unit (Country Risk Service
and Country Forecasts), Gallup International (50th Anniversary Survey), the Institute for
Management Development (World Competitiveness  Yearbook), the Political &
Economic  Risk Consultancy (Asian Intelligence  Issue), the Political Risk Services
(International  Country Risk Guide), World Development Report (Private Sector Survey)
and the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness  Report), etc.. Note: TI has
corruption indexes for earlier years as well. However, the underlying methodology
changes every year which makes inter-year comparison misleading. We re-scaled the TI
index by subtracting the original numbers from 10 so that a large number implies more
corruption.
GCR Index
Source: Appendix to Kaufmann and Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' speed up the wheels of
commerce". NBER working paper 7093. Original source: Global competitiveness report
96, 97
GCR are surveys conducted by the World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute
for International Development for the 1996 and 1997 Global Competitiveness Reports,
respectively. GCR surveys are on 1-7 scales. Corruption rating for a countly in this table
is the average of all individual responses for that counfry. In original surveys, a low
number means more corruption, the rating is re-scaled as 8 - original rating. GCR97 is
published in 1997 and the ranking is for 1996.
WDR Index
Source: Appendix to Kaufmann and Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' speed up the wheels of
commerce"  NBER working paper 7093. Original source: 1997 World Development
Report, survey conducted by the World Bank for its 1997 World Developmnent  Report.
The rating is then for 1996.
WDR surveys are on 1-6 scales. Corruption  rating for a country in this table is the
average of all individual responses for that country. In original surveys, a low number
means more corruption, the rating is re-scaled as 7 - original rating.
3. Instrumental Variables for Corruption
Civil liberty and political freedom (1993)
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Freedom House Survey T'eam, 1993-
1994
CIV is the abbreviation for civil liberties index. Liberties index measures the
extent to which people are able to express their opinion  openly without fears of reprisals
25and are protected in doing so by an independent  judiciary. Though this index reflects rights
to organize and demonstrate  as well as freedom  of religion, education,  travel and other
personal  rights; more weight was given to those liberties  most directly related to the
expression  of political rights. This variable is an index and not in logs.
POL is the abbreviation for political right index. Political rights index measures
rights to participate meaningfully  in the political process on a scale of one to seven where
lower numbers indicate greater political rights (see Gastil, 1989).  A high-ranking country
must have a fully operating electoral  procedure,  usually including a significant  opposition
vote. It is likely to have had a recent change of government  from one party to another, an
absence of foreign domination,  decentralized  political  power and a consensus  that allows
all segments  of the population some power. The index was constructed  on the basis of
satisfaction  of the above and other related criteria  by the countries in question. This
variable  is an index and not in logs.
Both indexes  range from 1 to 7. Smaller  number means higher degree of freedom.
Democracy is defined as (7-civ)+(7-pol).
Corruption in Judicial System
Source, "lack of legal corruption," survey in 1996 for the Global Competitiveness  Report
1997.
Question 8.09 Legal corruption, "Irregular payments to judges or other officials involved
in the enforcement and execution of judgements are not common and do not influence the
outcome of court proceedings" (l=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Rescaled 7 - original score Thus a smaller number means less corrupt  judicial system.
4. Tax Evasion and Tax Rates
Tax Evasion
Source: survey (in 1996) for the Global Competitiveness Report 1997
2.10 Tax evasion, Tax evasion is minimal in your country. (1  =strongly disagree,
7=strongly agree). Re-scaled as 7 -original score
Statutory Corporate Tax Rates
Courtesy of Altshuler for providing the data used in Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon
(1998)
Notes: 1. For Bermuda, effective tax rate was used instead of statutory rates. The
statutory rate for Bermuda was zero, but the effective rate was positive.  2.  In some
cases judgement was made on the appropriate rate due to the presence of tax holidays.
5. Other Variables
Current Account Surplus
Source: World Bank Sima/GDF & DDI Central
Current account balance (% of GDP)1984-1997,  in cross section regression used the
average of 1984-96.
26Government  Consumption
Source: World Bank Sima/GDF & WDI Central
General government consumption (% of GDP)
1984-1997,  in cross section regression used the average of 1984-96.
Government  Debt
Source:  World Bank Sima/GDF & WDI Central
Central government debt, total (% of GDP)
1984-1997,  in cross section regression used the average of 1984-96.
Inflation
Source: World Bank Sima/GDF & WDI Central
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a
fixed basket of goods and services. In general, a Laspeyres index formula is used.
1984-1997,  in cross section regression used the average of 1984-96.
Index of Legal Independence of Central Banks
Source: Courtesy of Milesi-Ferretti. Original source is Cukierman et al. (1992).
1984-89,  used 1989 data in cross section regressions
Higher numbers correspond to more central bank independence.
Actual Turnover of Central Bankers Per Year.
Source: Courtesy of Milesi-Ferretti. Original source is Cukierman et al. (1992).
1984-89,  used 1989 data in cross section regressions
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29Table la: Summary Statistics
Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Aggregate  capital control  177  2.44  1.57  0  5
Current account controls  40  0.13  0.10  0.01  0.33
Capital account controls  40  0.38  0.30  0.01  0.95
Corruption-TI  84  5.10  2.41  0  8.6
Corruption  - WDR  72  3.21  0.91  1  4.6
Corruption-  ICRG  122  2.57  1.28  0  6
Corruption  - GCR  58  3.40  1.42  1.3  5.5
Legal Corruption - GCR  53  1.70  1.47  0  4.53
Democracy  175  6.62  3.97  0  12
Note: Democracy is constructed by summing up the political rights and civil liberties indexes.
Table lb: Pairwise Correlation
Capital Controls  Corruption  Legal
Aggregate  CA  KA  TI  WDR  ICRG  GCR  corruption
Current account control  0.78  1
Capital account control  0.88  0.83  1
Corruption -TI  0.58  0.53  0.52  1
Corruption -WDR  0.62  0.55  0.65  0.86  1
Corruption - ICRG  0.44  0.49  0.43  0.85  0.55  1
Corruption - GCR  0.56  0.52  0.60  0.87  0.83  0.65  1
Legal corruption  0.55  0.50  0.58  0.89  0.77  0.80  0.80  1
Democracy  -0.44  -0.57  -0.49  -0.68  -0.50  -0.66  -0.57  -0.67
Table 2: Bureaucratic Corruption and Capital Controls
Dependent Variable = capital control
Specification
Ordered  probit  Panel  IV
Corruption measure  TI  GCR97  WDR97  ICRG96  ICRG  GCR97
Corruption  0.275**  0.440**  0.834**  0.239**  0.079**  0.415**
(0.071)  (0.129)  (0.189)  (0.101)  (0.036)  (0.183)
OECD  -0.665**  -0.747**  -0.465  -1.051**  -2.180**  -0.979**
(0.333)  (0.344)  (0.367)  (0.307)  (0.123)  (0.401)
R  2  0.15  0.16  0.15  0.10  0.29  0.16
No. of Obs  83  57  71  120  1629  51
1. White-robust  standard errors in brackets. **, * and # denote significant at the 5%, 10% and the 15%
levels, respectively.
2. Pseudo R2 for ordered probit and IV regressions. Adjusted R 2 for panel regression (LSDV, fixed effects
with year dumiies).
3. Estimates on the constant and the cutoff parameters are not reported.
30Table 3:  Corruption  and Capital Controls  After Adding Regional Dummies
Dependent Variable  = capital control
Specification  ordered  probit  panel  IV
Corruption measure  TI  GCR97  WDR97  ICRG96  ICR4J  GCR97
Corruption  0.308**  0.501**  0.880**  0.210**  0.030  0.539**
(0.074)  (0.135)  (0.201)  (0.103)  (0.035)  (0.204)
OECD  -0.795**  -0.845**  -0.309  -1.078**  -1.926***  -0.887**
(0.362)  (0.394)  (0.406)  (0.321)  (0.125)  (0.432)
Sub-Sahara  0.090'  0.906  0.515#  0.540**  0.857**  1.020
Africa  (0.365)  (0.807)  (0.325)  (0.269)  (0.103)  (0.820)
East Asia and  -0.242  -0.257  0.302  -0.030  -0.820(**  -0.201
Pacific  (0.373)  (0.412)  (0.546)  (0.324)  (0.128)  (0.420)
Latin America  -0.789**  -0.498  -0.597  -0.519*  0.222**  -0.402
(0.356)  (0.444)  (0.418)  (0.289)  (0.111)  (0.529)
R  2  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.13  0.35  0.18
No. of Obs  83  57  71  120  1629  51
31Table 4: Corruption and Capital Controls with Additional Control Variables
Dependent Variable:  capital control
Specification
ordered  probit  Panel  IV
Corruption  measure  TI  GCR  ICRG96  ICRG  ICRG  GCR  GCR
Corruption  0.567**  2.491**  0.723**  0.124#  0.110*  0.810*  0.821**
(0.175)  (0.994)  (0.306)  (0.083)  (0.067)  (0.489)  (0.396)
Current Account  0.037  -0.052  -0.008  -0.057**  -0.020**  -0.183#  -0.072
Balance/GDP  (0.064)  (0.188)  (0.060)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.117)  (0.095)
Government  0.146**  0.459**  0.084  -0.085**  0.016  0.099  0.131#
Consumption/GDP  (0.071)  (0.203)  (0.061)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.092)  (0.086)
Government  -0.013**  -0.017  -0.011  **  -0.004*  -0.001  -0.005  -0.001
Debt/GDP  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)
Inflation  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001  0.010**  -0.0003  -0.002  -0.002
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Central bank legal  -0.150  -4.238  1.322  -2.123**  -1.642  -3.430  -1.970
Independence  (1.881)  (4.173)  (2.067)  (0.874)  (2.801)  (2.608)  (2.260)
Central bankers  5.577**  21.868**  3.584**  1.012#  3.271**  8.946**  6.875**
Turnover  (1.738)  (7.832)  (1.471)  (0.627)  (1.375)  (2.823)  (1.932)
OECD  -0.963  -0.931  -1.546**  -1.669**  -1.134
(0.691)  (1.462)  (0.639)  (0.290)  (0.856)
Sub-Sahara  0.374  -0.043  -0.067
Africa  (0.769)  (0.704)  (0.285)
East Asia and  -0.513  -1.169  -1.212*  -2.789**  -1.720*
Pacific  (0.760)  (1.434)  (0.721)  (0.238)  (0.909)
Latin America  -0.601  0.514  -1.048  -1.708**  -1.851
(0.919)  (1.595)  (0.899)  (0.357)  (1.380)
R2  0.39  0.66  0.33  0.65  0.13  0.36  0.29
No. of Obs  32  25  33  167  167  25  25
Panel 1: LSDV with year dunmmies.  Panel 2: country random effects with year dummies. Also see
footnotes to Table 2.
32Table 5: Effect  of a Rise in Corruption  on Capital  Controls  <cite in the text>
PO  Pi  P2  P3  P4  P5
(Based on the last regression in Table 3)
Corruption=4.3  (e.g. Ukrain)  0.13  0.26  0.15  0.31  0.10  0.04
Corruption= 1.6  (e.g. Singapore)  0.64  0.25  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.00
(Based on the second to the last regression
in Table 4)
Corruption  =4.3 (e.g. Ukrain)  0.04  0.28  0.34  0.32,  0.01  0.00
Corruption  = 1.6 (e.g. Singapore)  0.68  0.28  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00
Note: P0, P1,  ..., P5 denote the probability  that the aggregate  capital control  index = 0,  1, ...,  5,
respectively. Used average values for explanatory variables other than corruption.
Table 6: More Detailed Coding of Current Account Restrictions
Dept. variable:  current account control
TI  GCR  WDR  ICRG  GCRIV
Corruption  0.006  0.016**  0.003  0.008  0.011
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.038)  (0.013)  (0.009)
OECD  -0.124**  -0.119**  -0.142**  -0.123 *  -0.125**
(0.023)  (0.025)  (0.067)  (0.027)  (0.024)
Sub-Sahara  -0.037  0.101**  -0.053  -0.022  0.098**
Africa  (0.103)  (0.021)  (0.118)  (0.103)  (0.021)
East Asia and  0.001  -0.001  -0.015  0.006  0.002
Pacific  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.026)  (0.023)
Latin America  -0.036  -0.011  -0.024  -0.032  -0.011
(0.051)  (0.056)  (0.022)  (0.052)  (0.055)
p-value for Hausman test  0.99
p-value for test  0.06
of overidentification
R2  0.52  0.65  0.55  0.46  0.65
No. of Obs  38  32  21  37  32
Note: For the Hausman test, Ho: the differences in the coefficients from the OLS and IV regressions are
not systematic. For the overidentification  test, Ho: E[residuals * instruments] = 0.  White-robust standard
errors  in brackets.
33Table 7: More Detailed Coding of Capital Account Restrictions
Dept. variable. capital account control
TI  GCR  WDR  ICRG  GCRIV
Corruption  0.032#  0.078**  0.160  0.016  0.083*
(0.021)  (0.037)  (0.107)  (0.034)  (0.041)
OECD  -0.268**  -0.275**  -0.170  -0.335**  -0.269**
(0.111)  (0.102)  (0.229)  (0.093)  (0.102)
Sub-SaharanAfrica  -0.203  0.033  -0.115  -0.199  0.035
(0.205)  (0.077)  (0.336)  (0.184)  (0.076)
East Asia and Pacific  0.038  0.006  0.167  0.037  0.004
(0.086)  (0.088)  (0.170)  (0.093)  (0.083)
Latin America  -0.066  0.014  0.046  -0.077  0.013
(0.164)  (0.169)  (0.083)  (0.159)  (0.169)
p-value for test  0.74
of overidentification
R-  20.40  0.55  0.47  0.37  0.55
No. of Obs  38  32  21  37  32
Table 8:  Corruption and Tax Evasion
Dept. Variable: tax evasion
Measure of  Legal  Legal
corruption  TI  TI  GCR  GCR  WDR  WDR  corruption  corruption
Corruption  0.333**  0.374**  0.597**  0.613**  0.834**  0.841**  0.505**  0.497**
(0.035)  (0.046)  (0.071)  (0.084)  (0.182)  (0.188)  (0.071)  (0.095)
Statutory tax  3.313**  2.719**  3.534**  3.397**  4.810**  4.776**  4.799**  4.852**
Rate  (1.164)  (1.101)  (0.995)  (1.017)  (1.060)  (1.211)  (1.216)  (1.154)
OECD  0.320  0.080  0.027  -0.041
(0.237)  (0.243)  (0.318)  (0.293)
R2  0.7  0.71  0.7  0.7  0.74  0.74  0.61  0.61
No. of Obs  42  42  42  42  23  23  42  42
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